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Agencification has had a major role in the institutional development and handling of the 
financial crisis in the European Union. In this article it is examined whether this institu-
tional trend, along with the institutionalist approach of Rodrik, has played a similar role in 
post-2010 financial stabilization in Hungary, and if so, exactly how it affected the pro-
cess. The focus is on public administration, which was renewed on the Fundamental 
Law enacted in 2011, and providing a basis for the new legal and institutional frame-
work for the regulation and supervision of the financial markets. 
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Introduction
Purpose
The trend called “agencification” is a well-known, few-decades old phenomenon in 
the organisational development of the regulatory and supervisory institutional system 
of the European Union and in its Member States and other countries like the USA or 
Latin-American countries.  
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The purpose of this article is to examine the correlations and interactions be-
tween this trend and actions taken by the Hungarian government after 2010 in the 
interest of economic, especially financial stabilization. Following a general overview 
of the legal and institutional framework of financial regulation and supervision, and 
of monetary policy in the new public service system described in the new constitu-
tion (Fundamental Law, approved on 25 April 2011 and effective from 1 January 
2012). Then the government policies and measures taken to consolidate state debt 
are discussed. General and Hungary-specific information is given on the doctrine of 
agencification in a separate chapter. 
As a synthesis, the exact institutional pattern of financial regulation and supervi-
sion and monetary policy in Hungary are outlined and examined from the perspec-
tive of agencification, and from the perspective of the institutionalist doctrines of 
Rodrik. 
Methodology: Rodrik’s institutionalist approach 
The post-2010 Hungarian government has intended to stabilize the economy of 
Hungary with measures resulting in systemic changes, by creating a new and con-
sistent system of institutions and economic structures, instead of renewing a set of 
obsolete economic structures. These measures were rather unconventional from 
the viewpoint of the neoliberal economic dogmatics, and are therefore declared 
as “unorthodoxies” (Lentner, 2013, pp. 296-303). In this article the institutional 
changes of this process are to be examined, which requires a qualitative analysis 
(e.g. the analysis of the legal framework) rather than a quantitative analysis, apart 
from mentioning some simple and relevant figures. Hereunder is justified why ex-
actly the approach of Rodrik is the best way to examine institutions. Further below, 
the examination from the aspect of the role of agencies and the trend of agencifica-
tion will be presented as another institutionalist approach fitting very well into the 
paradigm of Rodrik.  
In their research Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian identified three “deep 
determinants” of income: geography, integration and institutions (see Figure 1) and 
found that the “quality of institutions overrides everything else” (Rodrik and Subra-
manian, 2003, p. 31). Institution is defined as by Lin and Nugent, quoted by Rodrik: 
“It is useful to think of institutions broadly as a set of humanly devised behavioural 
rules that govern and shape the interactions of human beings, in part by helping 
them to form expectations of what other people will do” (Lin and Nugent, 1995, pp. 
2306-2307; Rodrik, 2000, p. 4). Rodrik adds: “All well-functioning market economies 
are ‘embedded’ in a set of non-market institutions, without which markets cannot 
perform adequately” (Rodrik, 2000, p. 4).
Rodrik distinguishes four types of institutions: 1) market creating institutions which 
protect property rights and ensure that contracts are enforced, 2) market regulating 
institutions which deal with externalities, economics of scale, and imperfect infor-
mation, 3) market stabilizing institutions which ensure low inflation, minimize macro-
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economic volatility, and avert financial crisis, and 4) market legitimizing institutions 
which provide social protection and insurance, involve redistribution and manage 
conflict (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003, p. 32; Lentner, 2013, pp. 28-29; Lentner, 
2015, p. 24).
Figure 1: The three “deep determinants” of income by Rodrik 
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There is an array of choices for all institutional functions. They include questions 
about the character of the legal regime, the balance between regulation and competi-
tion, the size of the public sector, etc. As a mere economic analysis cannot give answer 
to these questions, such country-specific factors as geography, history, political econo-
my and other initial conditions influence the choice of forms. Rodrik emphasizes that 
“successful developing countries have almost always combined unorthodox elements 
with orthodox policies” (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003, p. 33).
This is why Rodrik’s institutionalist model is ideal for analysing the post-2010 eco-
nomic policy and institutions of financial supervision in Hungary. Although Hungary 
is not a developing but a developed economy, its economic policy since 2010 has 
openly been declared (also in its self-definition) unorthodox and contrary to the neo-
liberal doctrines (Lentner, 2013, pp. 296-303), just as the paradigm of Rodrik, which 
was first declared unorthodox by the author himself, approximately a decade earlier 
than the April 2010 elections in Hungary (Rodrik, 2000, p. 3, 14).  
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The financial stabilization of Hungary after 2010
The political context of financial stabilization
The April 2010 (and then April 2014) parliamentary elections resulted in an over-
whelming victory for the Fidesz-KDNP coalition, with a majority exceeding 2/3 of 
the parliamentary seats, and this has enabled the coalition to change fundamental 
elements of the public and legal system, including the constitution. The previous con-
stitution (Act XX of 1949) was affected by a communist heritage, since after the fall of 
the communist regime in 1989, no new constitution was adopted, only amendments 
were made in order to make the constitution comply with a capitalist democracy. 
Numerous other elements of the legal system, in a number of legal fields from 
criminal to financial law, and especially in the field of administrative had been over-
amended over the decades, and therefore needed renewal or replacement. Other acts 
were enacted to fulfil the purposes of the economic policy of the government. 
Another serious encumbrance was the heritage of the economic and financial crisis 
of 2007-2008. Besides the malfunctioning markets, the government had to struggle with 
the sovereign debt inherited from its predecessors, since the left-wing liberal coalition 
governing between 2002 and 2010 had acted according to the neoliberal idea that the state 
must be financed from international credits (IMF, World Bank and ECB) (see Lentner, 
2013, pp. 317-322).
The crisis brought about a nearly global paradigm change. The neoliberal economic 
policy, and its administrative counterpart, the New Public Management (NPM) proved 
to be insufficient (Lőrincz, 2010, pp. 50-51). NPM, focusing on competition and profit 
to measure the efficiency of administration in a given state, was replaced by the neo-We-
berian State (NWS) (Lynn, 2008), a combination of “Weberian” and “neo” elements, in 
other words, a reorganisation of the Weberian elements without neglecting the achieve-
ments of the previous paradigms. Above all, this means “the reaffirmation of the state 
as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of globalization”, the reaffirma-
tion of representative democracy as legitimating element, the reaffirmation the role 
of administrative law in regard of the principles of state-citizen relationship, and “the 
preservation of the idea of a public service with distinctive status, culture, and terms 
and conditions” (Lynn, 2008, p. 27). The “neo” elements include e.g. the external ori-
entation of the administration (i.e. towards citizens), the professionalization of public 
services, a redesign of the management of resources in order to focus on virtual achieve-
ments rather than simply following protocols, etc. (Lynn, 2008, p. 27).
The government policies adopted in 2010 closely follow these principles and ap-
ply economic unorthodoxy in order to fulfil the functions of the good state and good 
governance for the satisfaction of the citizens. Although in their study Domokos et al. 
mention that during the renewal of governance, the experiences gained in corporate 
management should be used, an intensive use of tools like the controls and reports by 
the State Audit Office of Hungary are inevitable for the good governance (Domokos 
et al., 2016). 
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Legal framework for financial supervision
Besides the Fundamental Law, the most important legislative acts were those which re-
defined the administrative system in Hungary, including the institutional design and 
functional role of the organisations in charge of financial regulation and supervision.
The most comprehensive act regulating the institutional structure which second 
to the Fundamental Law in the hierarchy is Act XLIII of 2010 on central state admin-
istrative organisations and on the legal status of government members and state secre-
taries (Ksztv.). The Ksztv. defines the status and, in some cases, the competences of the 
certain types of administrative organisations. This categorization of the administrative 
organisations is crucial for our topic, since agencies, except for some, are certain types 
of organisations in this typology. (However, just as in most legal systems, under Hun-
garian law, “agency” is not defined in legal texts or not in the meaning or context it is 
used here. It has an administrative definition adjusted to legal requirements.)
The role of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (Pénzügyi Szervezetek 
Állami Felügyelete, PSZÁF) was re-regulated in Act CLVIII of 2010, in effect until the 
adoption of Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the National Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank, MNB), which merged PSZÁF into the MNB. Financial institutions were also re-
regulated by the Act CCXXXVII of 2013 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enter-
prises and Act LXXXIII of 2014 on Business of Insurance. 
Although fiscal legislation is beyond the scope of this article, two important acts 
have to be mentioned: Act CXCIV on the Economic Stability of Hungary and the Act 
LXVI of 2011 on the State Audit Office of Hungary, which, along with the relevant 
provisions of the Fundamental Law (mainly the chapter on Public Finances, i.e. Arti-
cles 36-44) unquestionably provide a restrictive safeguard against credit borrowings 
which would be contrary to the reasonable management of the state.
Main achievements of the new economic policy of the Government of Hungary
Below is a short overview on the structure of measures taken by the government to 
financially stabilize Hungary. The four main areas of the consolidation were: (1) the 
central state budget, (2) the social security system, (3) indebted municipalities, and 
(4) debtors indebted in foreign currency and the bank sector (Lentner, 2013).
The most serious problems of the central sub-system of the national budget in-
cluded the growing budget deficit and sovereign debt. By extension of the scope of 
taxpayers, re-integration of private pension funds to the budget and launching pro-
grammes to reduce the unemployment rate and boost economic growth (such as the 
National Development Plan) the government managed to remedy the situation. As a 
result of the replacement of IMF loans by market-based ones, financial independence 
and Hungary’s room to manoeuvre increased and exposure to IMF policies decreased 
(Lentner, 2013, pp. 322-323). The “supporting monetary policy” adopted by the MNB 
was a great assistance to the government. It is suffice to share two indices reflecting 
the achievements: the base interest rate of MNB fell from 7% (in December 2011) to 
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2.1% (in September 2014), and since 2014 the inflation rate is around zero (Lentner, 
2015, pp. 19-20).
The main point in the consolidation of the social security system included the 
re-integration of private pension funds. Indebted municipalities were consolidated 
in 2012 through both regulatory and bail-out measures. In order to assist people seri-
ously indebted in foreign currency loans, regulatory measures were also introduced, 
such as the prohibition of unilateral contract amendments by banks, the fixed-rate 
consolidation of the loan amount into Hungarian currency, or the strengthened com-
petences of the National Bank of Hungary and the then still existing Hungarian Fi-
nancial Supervisory Authority (Lentner, 2013, pp. 324-329). 
Agencies with special focus on financial supervision
The nature of agencies
There is no universal definition for the term “agency” and scholars cannot agree on a 
universal definition even in a single country (e.g. Hungary). The key elements include 
the  non-departmental character and the relative independence of the central government. Ac-
cording to one of the most permissive definitions, agencies are non-departmental bodies, 
and in this approach, non-profit companies can also be agencies, provided that they 
have the required government background (since the definition says that an agency 
is an organisational unit created by acta iure imperii with a national competence under 
government control) with a considerably greater autonomy than ministerial depart-
ments, and a non-commercial purpose. Consequently, this definition only excludes 
for-profit companies (Hajnal, 2011, pp. 57-59).
According to another definition, in a functionalist approach, three activities must 
be performed by an organisation to qualify as an agency: 1) adoption of decisions as 
an authority, and give guidance to other participants in the given market, 2) function-
ing as a quasi-court, with a board making decisions in adversarial procedures and 3) 
functioning as a quasi-legislator, creating mostly soft laws (Fazekas, 2013, pp. 111-
112). The latter definition, especially the first condition, emphasizes another impor-
tant characteristic of agencies, namely that they are almost always bound to a special type 
of market, sector or policy.
In addition, the latter definition clearly shows that, irrespective of their specific 
sector, agencies meet the conditions of market creating institutions since they enforce 
certain rights. They also meet the conditions of market legitimizing institutions, as for 
instance manage and resolve conflicts. 
The phenomenon called agencification has a double meaning in the relevant lit-
erature. On the one hand, it means the quantitative proliferation of agencies under 
a certain legal regime, and on the other, it represents qualitative changes: agencies 
are assigned an increasing number of tasks, and consequently, new competences to 
perform these tasks. This trend is closely related to the paradigm of new statism dis-
cussed above. 
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The agencies of the European Union
The EU agencies in general
Although the history of agencies is considered to begin in the Pan-American conti-
nent at around the middle of the 20th century (Kálmán, 2013, p. 1), the European 
Union has a long history of agencies, with an increasingly intense trend of agencifica-
tion in approximately the last three decades. 
The EU-specific agency-definition, accepted in this study due to its consistency, 
is as follows: “A ‘European agency’ is a public administration body established by a 
legal act of the European Union, has a legal personality and a relatively independent 
organisation, and participates in the regulation of a certain line on a European level 
and/or in the implementation of a EU-policy” (Kálmán, 2013, p. 3).
The above definition reflects the most controversial features of agencies, namely, 
their relative independence and non-departmental character. By nature, EU agencies 
are non-treaty based, which means that they do not have an explicit legal basis in the 
primary law of the EU (Szegedi, 2012, p. 349). They are only implicitly acknowledged 
in the Founding Treaties, and Art. 263 (1) and (5) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of European Union (TFEU) provides a legal remedy against the decisions of agencies, 
when it talks about “bodies, offices and agencies” of the European Union as objects of 
legal control of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
To understand the exact place and role of the agencies in the EU, the structure 
of the European administration need to be considered briefly. Danwitz distinguishes 
the EU’s own administrative law (Eigenverwaltungsrecht), enforced by the organisations 
of the EU, the common administrative law (Gemeinschaftsverwaltungsrecht), enforced 
by the authorities of the Member States, and cooperative administrative law (Koopera-
tions- oder Verbundverwaltungsrecht), enforced in cooperation (Danwitz, 2008, pp. 312-
314). Since agencies are subject to the EU’s own administrative law (Danwitz, 2008, p. 
319), as a result of agencification, the enforcement of the EU law shifts towards direct 
enforcement, which means that the positions of EU organisations are strengthening 
in comparison to the authorities of Member States. 
In this article Comte’s functional categorization is adopted with five types of EU 
agencies: 1) decision-making agencies (e.g. the European Union Intellectual Prop-
erty Office, which is the successor of the former Office for Harmonisation in the In-
ternal Market), 2) agencies providing direct assistance to the Commission and, where 
necessary, to the Member States, in the form of technical or scientific advice and/or 
inspection reports (e.g. European Maritime Safety Agency), 3) agencies in charge of 
operation activities (e.g. EUROPOL), 4) information agencies (e.g. European Centre 
for the Development of Vocational Training) and 5) agencies providing services to 
other agencies and institutions (e.g. Translation Centre for the Bodies of the Euro-
pean Union) (Comte, 2010, pp. 84-86).
Chronologically, three generations are distinguished: 1) first-generation agencies, 
established before 1975, 2) second-generation agencies, established between 1975 and 
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the 2003 framework regulation and 3) third-generation agencies, including executive 
agencies set up in accordance with the framework regulation (Council Regulation 
(EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies 
to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes) 
and the regulatory agencies created after 2003 (Danwitz, 2008, pp. 319-320).
This leads us to the third important categorization including a difference between 
executive and regulatory agencies. According to the relevant communication of the 
Commission, executive agencies were created in accordance with and on the basis of 
the abovementioned framework regulation (European Commission, 2008, p. 3). The 
regulatory agencies have their own separate legal bases, which are generally separate 
regulations for each of them.
The European Supervisory Authority
The three financial supervisory authorities, namely, the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (EMSA) and the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), collectively referred to as 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) are third-generation decision-making 
Figure 2:  The European Supervisory Authorities in the European System of Financial 
Supervision  
Microprudential supervision
European System of Financial Supervision
(ESFS)
Macroprudential supervision
Competent or supervisory authorities
National supervisory authorities
Chairman of the “Economic and Financial
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Source: Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier, Luxembourg, www.cssf.lu/en/eu-internatio-
nal/eu-authorities/
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regulatory agencies. These three agencies were established after several unsuccessful 
efforts made by the decision-makers of the EU to handle the 2007-2008 crisis, when 
they realized that more powerful organisations are needed to regulate and supervise 
the three sub-sectors of the financial market. On the one hand, this decision is a wel-
come acknowledgment of the failure of the concept of the neoliberal self-regulatory 
market, and on the other, the extensive competences of these authorities may seem 
to be an overkill or a legal risk for the participants of the market.
Given that these agencies are beyond the focus of this article, only the highest risk is 
mentioned here: Art. 8 (2) f) of each of the three statutes (1092/2013/EU, 1094/2010/
EU and 1095/2010/EU regulations establishing the European Supervisory Authori-
ties), which enables the agencies to make individual decisions addressed to financial 
institutions in specific cases, practically bypassing Competent National Authorities. 
Although the three ESAs have a common Board of Appeal to provide legal remedy 
against such decisions, and clients can also appeal to the CJEU against the decision of 
the Board of Appeal, as Cleynenbreugel points out, several questions still remain: e.g. 
it is not clear whether the Competent National Authorities and the respective Mem-
ber States can take a different stance in the case, and what types of decisions the client 
can appeal (for further details see Cleynenbreugel, 2012, pp. 242-249).
Agencies in Hungary in after 2010
Agencies cannot be mentioned in Hungary before the 1989-1990 end of the commu-
nist regime, because the term cannot be interpreted in an authoritarian regime. This 
article only focuses on Hungarian public service agencies set up by Parliament elected 
in April 2010 (and the Government in office after June 2010).
In the new public service system of Hungary, in the opinion of the author of this 
article, “autonomous regulatory organisations” (as defined in Art. 23 of the Funda-
mental Law, and Art. 1 (6) Ksztv.) qualify primarily as agencies. This is decided, how-
ever, by the science of administration rather than legal acts, since the Hungarian legal 
system, similarly to other legal systems in Europe does not use the term “agency”. 
According to the Fundamental Law: “Parliament may establish autonomous regula-
tory organs by a cardinal Act for the performance of certain tasks and the exercise of 
certain competences belonging to the executive branch” (Art. 23 (1) Fundamental Law) 
and “The head of an autonomous regulatory organ shall be appointed by the Prime 
Minister or, on the proposal of the Prime Minister, by the President of the Republic for 
the term specified in a cardinal Act. The head of an autonomous regulatory organ shall 
appoint his or her deputy or deputies” (Art. 23 (2) of the Fundamental Law). “The head 
of an autonomous regulatory organ shall report annually to Parliament on the activities 
of the autonomous regulatory organ” (Art. 23 (3) of the Fundamental Law). “Acting 
on the basis of authorisation by an Act and within his or her functions laid down in a 
cardinal Act, the head of an autonomous regulatory organisation shall issue decrees; no 
such decree shall conflict with any Act, government decree, decree of the Prime Minister, 
decree of a Minister or decree of the Governor of the National Bank of Hungary. In is-
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suing decrees, the head of an autonomous regulatory organisation may be deputized by 
the deputy appointed in a decree” (Art. 23 (4) of the Fundamental Law). 
The above quoted provisions of the Fundamental Law clearly show that autono-
mous regulatory organisations have a distinct position in the public administration 
of Hungary in comparison to other organisation types listed in the Ksztv. First of all, 
the other types are not regulated in a separate article, or a special regulation in the 
Fundamental Law, which means that the legislator does not deem it necessary to regu-
late them on constitutional level, and consequently, their function does not require 
constitutional guarantees to balance the power of executive organisations. Moreover, 
as revealed in Art. 23 (4), the decree issued by the head of an autonomous regulatory 
organisation is a normative act, as it is included in the hierarchy of normative legal 
acts. It follows from this that autonomous regulatory organisations are not only quasi-
legislators, but in the executive branch it is authorised to regulate by normative acts.
According to Art. 1 (6) of the Ksztv., only two organisations qualify as autonomous 
regulatory organisations: the Hungarian National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority (Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság, NMHH) and the Hungarian Energy 
and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (Magyar Energetikai és Közmű-szabályozási Hi-
vatal, MEKH). Before its merger into the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) on 1 
October 2013, the third one was the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority.
The acts establishing and defining the duties of NMHH and MEKH assign them the 
competences of an authority and the powers of a quasi-court. (In the case of NMHH, 
these acts include Act CLXXXV of 2010 on the Media and Act C of 2003 on Electronic 
Communications, while MEKH is subject to Act XXII of 2013 on the Hungarian En-
ergy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority). For example, Art. 165 (1) of the Media 
Act allows clients to appeal against NMHH’s decisions adopted as an authority to its su-
pervisory organ, the Media Council. These organisations also issue soft-law documents. 
In conclusion it can be said that both NMHH and MEKH fit in the above defini-
tion given by Fazekas, since they function as authorities, quasi-courts and quasi-legis-
lators. In the author’s opinion, there is no other organisation type which would meet 
all these criteria in general. The National Bank of Hungary, which is not regulated by 
the Ksztv. but by a separate act, the already mentioned MNB Act, can be considered as 
an agency, in the next chapter this statement will be justified.  
 
The new Hungarian system of financial supervision 
Transitional period between the Act on PSZÁF (2010) and the new MNB Act (2013)
General ideas about the system
In this period, there was a joint financial supervision depending on the institutional 
cooperation between PSZÁF, the MNB, the Hungarian Competition Authority (Gaz-
dasági Versenyhivatal, GVH), the three European Supervisory Authorities established 
in the meantime, and other specific (or sometimes general, e.g. European Commis-
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sion) organisations on both a EU and a national level (Seregdi, 2013; Sudár, 2013). 
The MNB (which was at that time regulated by the short-lived Act CCVIII of 2011) 
was primarily responsible for monetary policy and the macroprudential supervision 
of financial markets, while PSZÁF was responsible for microprudential supervision. 
As Art. 41 (1) of the Fundamental Law stipulates: “The National Bank of Hun-
gary shall be the central bank of Hungary. The National Bank of Hungary shall be 
responsible for monetary policy as laid down in a cardinal Act.” As Art. 3 of the MNB 
Act provides: “The primary objective of the MNB shall be to achieve and maintain 
price stability. Without prejudice to the primary objective, the MNB shall support the 
maintenance of the stability of the system of financial intermediation, the enhance-
ment of its resilience, its sustainable contribution to economic growth; furthermore, 
the MNB shall support the economic policy of the government using the instruments 
at its disposal.”
The above provisions stipulate that the primary objective of the MNB is to ensure 
price stability: “The MNB shall define and implement monetary policy” (Art. 4 (1) of 
the MNB Act), and in addition, it is required to support the stability of the financial 
market and the fiscal policy of the government. 
Figure 3: The Hungarian agencies in after 2010; the development of the financial supervision 
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Source: Edited by the author
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The interval discussed here followed the first regulatory responses of the Euro-
pean Union to the financial-economic crisis of 2007-2008, and consequently, the 
European Supervisory Authorities established by the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) already had a key role in prevention of system risks. The three ESAs, the 
ESRB and other minor organisations jointly constitute the European System of Finan-
cial Supervision (ESFS), with the national central banks acting as Member State-level 
macroprudential supervisors (Szombati, 2013, pp. 139-143).
Support to the government’s fiscal policy is tantamount to promoting the mainte-
nance of price stability, i.e. efforts to cut inflation. It is implemented using instruments 
such as the Funding for Growth Scheme (Növekedési Hitelprogram, NHP), launched in 
the in the spring of 2013 and intended to assist SMEs in their credit strategies by 
granting credits for investments and through current asset financing (Pillar I), credit 
management (Pillar II), both under favourable conditions; while Pillar III of the NHP 
is a special foreign currency interest rate swap aimed at providing euro-liquidity, also 
under favourable conditions (Lentner, 2013, pp. 202-208).
As mentioned above, up to the merger on 1 November 2013, PSZÁF was required 
to focus on the microprudential supervision of the financial market and institutions. 
Its competences fall into seven categories: 1) licensing: the operation or mergers of fi-
nancial and credit institutions, 2) supervision: the classic duty with strong investigative 
powers, 3) law enforcement: taking individual measures in specific cases, 4) regulation: 
active cooperation with the legislator in the development of the regulatory environ-
ment, 5) consumer protection: strong licences and innovative solutions (see below), 6) 
acting as a market authority: protecting the market mainly by prohibitions and, in crimi-
nal cases, by reports to the relevant authorities and 7) the publication of recommenda-
tions: communication to all market participants regarding expectations, supervisory 
experiences etc. in the form of soft-law documents (Seregdi, 2013, pp. 409-414).
Regarding consumer protection, it should be emphasized that perhaps the most 
important actor in Hungarian financial consumer protection, the Financial Arbitra-
tion Board (Pénzügyi Békéltető Testület, PBT) started operation on 1 January 2011. It is 
engaged in conflict management and mediation and is a key element in consumer 
protection in Hungary (Czajlik et al., 2013, pp. 444-445).
System assessment – in terms of agencification
Before 2010, PSZÁF had various organisational forms, changed within almost every 
three years, was definitely an autonomous regulatory organisation under Art. 1 (6) b) 
of the Ksztv. Taking into consideration the statements made in the relevant chapter, 
it qualifies as an agency. Against the conditions set up by Fazekas, PSZÁF: 1) was defi-
nitely and, by definition, an authority, 2) functioned as a quasi-court (e.g. the PBT) 
and 3) functioned as a quasi-legislator, since in addition to issuing soft-law documents 
for the market it supervised, it also acted as an autonomous regulatory organisation 
with authorisation based on the Fundamental Law to issue decrees included in the 
regular hierarchy of normative acts.
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The MNB, in the author’s opinion, did not qualify as an agency in that period. 
First of all, regarding its form, the MNB has never belonged to any type of organisa-
tions listed in the effective Ksztv. or other statutory regulations other than the MNB 
Act, which provides that it is “a legal person functioning in the form of company 
limited by shares”, with shares in the Hungarian state’s exclusive ownership (Art. 5 
of the MNB Act). As it is definitely not a non-profit company, but deals with profits 
and losses, and according to the definition of Hajnal, it should be excluded from the 
category of agencies. According to the definition given by Fazekas, it also fails the test, 
because although it functioned as an authority and as a quasi-legislator in terms of its 
macroprudential competences, it is definitely not a quasi-court.
System assessment in Rodrik’s institutionalist approach
Both PSZÁF and the MNB contributed a great deal to the stability of the financial sys-
tem of Hungary. In the author’s opinion, both embody all four institutional categories 
described by Rodrik. 
Their enforcement functions regarding the financial market and its participants 
make them market creating institutions. On account of their objectives and competenc-
es they clearly qualify as market regulating institutions. The fact that both were estab-
lished with the purpose of protecting market stability (PSZÁF on a microprudential 
and the MNB on a macroprudential level) makes them market stabilizing institutions. 
Finally, as the MNB is involved in re-distribution (see NHP) and PSZÁF was engaged 
in conflict management (see PBT), both of them are market legitimizing institutions. 
The financial supervisory system after 1 October, 2013
In accordance with the provisions of the new MNB Act, PSZÁF ceased to exist as an 
independent organisation and merged into the MNB with effect from 1 October, 
2013. The MNB has taken over the objectives and competences of PSZÁF with imme-
diate effect upon the merger. For our purposes this means that according to Fazekas’s 
definition of “agency”, the MNB qualifies as an agency. In terms of the institutional 
model, the MNB embodies all four institutional categories. 
Conclusions
The role of institutions in sustaining a well-functioning market economy is unques-
tionable. Long before the latest financial-economic crisis of 2007-08, at around the 
millennium, Rodrik and Subramanian designed a model of institutions whose pres-
ence is a prerequisite to the successful functioning of such an economy. In parallel, 
another institutional trend called agencification is gaining increasing significance in 
the European Union. These two institutionalist approaches are unavoidable in the 
examination of the responses given by a government of any Member State of the Eu-
ropean Union, in this case Hungary.
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In conclusion, it can be established that after 2010, the government of Hungary 
has definitely managed to keep pace with the above-mentioned institutional trends 
and make the administrative system comply with the expectations of the European 
Union. 
Regarding economic policies, however, the government of Hungary decided to 
take a different path than expected of us by the EU, which, up to now, has proved to 
be a great success, and hopefully will continue to do so. The Hungarian government 
decided to give up the neoliberal ideas, the New Public Management, and the debt 
management relying on credits from the IMF and the World Bank.
Unorthodox measures were introduced instead, and the role of the state and ad-
ministration in the regulation and supervision of the economy was replaced by a neo-
Weberian one. The IMF-credit was paid off and the financial exposure of the country 
was radically decreased. Economy boosting programmes were launched and the MNB 
supports the fiscal steps of the government by monetary policy instruments.
The financial market, perhaps the most seriously hit by the crisis, was gradually 
brought under a strong and responsive regime of regulation and supervision, which 
seems to function correctly. Disregarding the fact that the financial environment 
changes rapidly, the MNB became a powerful key stakeholder that qualifies as an 
agency, represents all four ideal institution types set out by Rodrik, and successfully 
manages both monetary policy and the macro- and microprudential supervision of 
the financial markets and its participants.
To sum it up: agencification has definitely played a major role in, and had a sub-
stantial effect on, the development of post-2010 financial stabilization in Hungary. 
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